Reference:Principles of STS Analysis and Design/Philosophical Premises and Values

Taking a cue from Morgan's framework (1980), we start by codifying the philosophical assumptions and values that underwrite STS analysis and design practice. These premises define a 'reality', the metaphors with which STS practitioners organize perceptions and understandings of individual and organizational capacities and limitations.

Principle 1: Value Clarification - The Design Philosophy

Guide and test design decisions against explicit values and assumptions which may be codified in a philosophy statement.

Value clarification is a process of making explicit the premises that inform design choices (Hill, 1971). Several techniques may be utilized (Jayaram, 1978; Davis, 1982). At issue are which and whose values will guide design decisions (Cummings and Mohrman, 1987).

Value clarification is a process of deliberation about and sharing of the tacit assumptions and values embedded in traditional modes of organizing. Participants share hopes and expectations and work to achieve agreement on the goals and objectives of the design team. The outcome is a set of shared values and assumptions that reflect the process. If codified, the resulting design philosophy becomes the basis for evaluating design choices and for obtaining organizational sanction for design decisions (Davis, 1982). It is common, although less effective, for the values and assumptions that guide design to be retained informally in the shared experiences of a design team.

The process that produces these shared appreciations of the design opportunity and challenge is just as important as its codification in an explicit statement. The values should be expressed in the language of the organization and refer to experiences of its members. Thus, copying the content of a design philosophy, without testing in an appropriate process, leads to a shallow understanding of assumptions and values.

Principle 2: Uncertainty

Uncertainty is a necessary condition of organizations and their technical systems.

Uncertainty has been a central theme of sociotechnical systems theory at least since Emery and Trist's (1965) discussion of the "turbulent environment". Perrow makes it a critical dimension of technology (1970) and further elaborates its significance for high risk complex systems (1984). Yet, the assertion of uncertainty as an ontological principle, a necessary view of organizational reality, requires explanation.

That uncertainty and equivocality are necessary attributes of organizational life has been well documented (Weick, 1979). The notion that technical systems necessarily embody uncertainty is less credible to engineers, systems designers, and managers. To understand this argument, we must first unconfound the concepts of 'technology' that social scientists define as including both knowledge, methods, and artifacts (Fry, 1982) from technical systems. Technology can be understood as a "body of knowledge about the cause and effect relations of our actions and of the machines and processes we build." Technical systems are artifacts; "sets of tools (equipment, facilities, and computers) as well as methods (procedures, programs, and software) all designed as a system to accomplish the transformations required by an organization." (Berniker, 1983)

Technologies are necessarily incomplete. Kurt Godel has shown that a system rich enough to include ordinary arithmetic cannot be both complete and perfect. Godel developed his proof in terms of symbolic logic untroubled by the variability of machinery, hardware, software, inputs or environments; the practical concerns of technology. The implication of Godel's proof is that no computer system can be designed that can completely check itself (Nagel and Newman, 1967) and that no technology can be perfected. Thus, technical systems, designed on the basis of incomplete technologies will always embody sources of uncertainty (Berniker, 1987).

The principle does not imply that specific technical system problems are not solved. That is the critical human role. It says that all problems and uncertainties cannot be eliminated. As problems are solved, competition, standards of quality, economies of scale and scope (Jelinek and Goldhar, 1984) and increasingly ambitious technical endeavors drive systems design towards increasing complexity until limited by emergent problems and technological deficiencies. We do not leave well enough alone for long.

STS practice argues that effective management of uncertainties instead of efficient performance of routines is critical to the long term survival of organizations in 'turbulent environments' and, therefore, should be the primary focus of work design.

Principle 3: Technological and Organizational Choice

Technology does not determine work organization or design. There are choices in the design of technical systems and the organizations that operate them.

There is a profound rejection of the 'technological imperative' throughout the STS literature coupled, paradoxically, with an equally profound respect for technology. "The technological imperative could be disobeyed with positive economic as well as human results" (Trist, 1981). The original coal mine experiments showed that nontraditional modes of work organization could be manifestly more effective than those of scientific management (Trist, Higgin, Murray, and Pollock, 1963).

Implicit in the distinction between technology, as knowledge, and technical systems, as artifacts, is the possibility that various technical systems and organizational configurations to operate them may be designed from a given technology (Berniker, 1987). This is a domain for potential choices by organization designers although, typically, systems designers and industrial engineers control these opportunities and seek to impose their values on design decisions (Taylor, 1979; Hedberg and Mumford, 1975). STS design practice calls upon multi-disciplinary design teams to make technical design decisions instead of technical experts (Cherns, 1976, Davis, 1982).

The strongest argument against technological determinism is epistemological. The necessary incompleteness of technology defines gaps in knowledge that become critical drivers of organizational problem-solving (Berniker, 1987). Work content is dominated by cognitive processes. Weick (1990) suggests that a "technology in the head and technology on the floor" may diverge and converge as the actions of operators bring them into correlation. How is work design to be specified and determined when its primary content is cognitive and its key role is 'failure management" (Perrow, 1984)? And what competence is available to engineers and systems designers to inform their design of the group cognitive processes required to respond to and control the impacts of gaps in technological knowledge? The cognitive demands of modern technical systems suggest that the human sciences are necessary contributors to work design.

The historical evidence suggests a different relationship between work organization and technology. Factories were built and equipment choices made in order to impose control and organization on workers (Nobel, 1986; Braverman, 1974); i.e. managerial concerns determined technical choices (Susman,1990). By accepting these past practices as technological necessities, organization designers abdicate access to significant opportunities for workplace innovation.

Nevertheless, the requirements of technology must be respected. Competent design and the discovery of technical system disturbances and challenges require careful analysis of technical systems and the technologies that inform them (Davis, 1982; Engelstad, 1979; Berniker, 1986). This is the key to improved effectiveness by work groups, to expanded work roles, and the justification for their autonomy. Far too often, social scientists ignore technology limiting the scope of their work place innovations.

Principle 4: Work as Problem-Solving Action and Motivated Behavior

Work is a purposeful causal interaction between a person and an environment that produces changes valued by that person. (Berniker, 1985)
and
Work is motivated behavior conditioned by individual needs, expectations and opportunities.

These paradoxical views of the fundamental nature of human action or behavior have been a core issue in the debates among the human sciences throughout its history. Put succintly, work may be understood as determining action or as determined behavior; complementary views of a single phenomena.

The STS literature provides evidence of acceptance of both views. On one hand, authors see work as behavior controlled by psychological needs as exemplified by discussions of psychological needs and the concern with job satisfaction by Walton (1975), Seashore (1975), Emery and Thorsrud (1976), Davis (1982), and Trist (1981) among many others even though the need-satisfaction model denies autonomy to the actor (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977, 1978; Alderfer, 1977).

Alternatively, STS theory postulates a purposeful ideal-seeking actor (Ackoff and Emery, 1972) with capacities to adapt, to control, and to manage; i.e. to act causally in response to problems and disturbances. The philosophical debate will not be resolved readily. Practical design requires that we attend to both sets of concerns. Needs must be met or work will suffer. They are necessary but not sufficient determinants of human action.

STS designers see people as solutions rather than problems in contrast with the Theory X assumptions of designers and managers: "People are unpredictable. If they are not stopped by the system design, they will screw things up" (Cherns, 1976). Such assumptions combined with engineering practice lead to the design of 'idiot-proof' systems; i.e. people free systems. The drive is to proscribe, as much as possible, human intervention in the system.

In this context, we can interpret the widespread acceptance of needs-satisfaction models by management as an extension of their manipulative and controlling roles to psychological domains. Some researchers suggest that managers manage employee perceptions of autonomy, responsibility and variety as a substitute for changing their organizations (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978)

The STS literature suggests a deep belief that groups of skilled workers, organized cooperatively with the responsibility, autonomy, and knowledge to deal with challenges, and motivated by the opportunity to meet their own goals at work, are the most effective organizational means to deal with emergent challenges to their productive performance (Emery, 1979; Susman, 1990). This belief in the capacities of individuals and groups has explicit work design implications that can lead to practical opportunities to improve both Quality of Working Life and organizational performance.

Principle 5: Participation

People have the right to participate in the design of their own work lives and in the decisions that guide their work activities.

Participation is viewed as both end and means (Mumford, 1983; Sashkin, 1986; Dickson, 1983). As a means, it will be discussed under compatibility. STS designers hold participation as an intrinsic good. Democracy is a core value in our society and participation is the basis of organizational democracy (Pateman, 1975; Gould, 1988). Thus, whatever the costs - and there are costs to participation (Markus, 1984) - participation is the preferred path to workplace innovation and more effective organization designs. Participation is an expression of the respect we have for organization members and their potential contribution to the success of the organization.

Participation in the design process means that people will be expected to "design" their own work lives, to experiment with their own work roles and learn in the process (Cherns, 1976). Consultants often support participation in workplace design without relinquishing their pride of authorship. Yet, it is the team's creativity that must take precedence. Starbuck (1975) suggests that the consultant's contribution should be measured by the quality of a design team's solutions, not his or her own. An expected outcome of participative design in groups is a growing capacity for effective self-design and increased responsibility for outcomes and learning.

Srivastva and Cooperrider (1986) argue that all organization necessarily involves participation. We hear a parallel argument in industry that generalizes all forms of involvement as "participation". Participation, as intended by this principle, refers to a proactive and conscious process of deciding about the design and functioning of a work group.

Principle 6: Open Sociotechnical Systems

The organization is conceived as a sociotechnical system; i.e. an integration of a social system, organizational members enacting their roles, and a technical system, the means they use to accomplish organizational goals, into a coherent open system in commerce with a relevant environment.

The organization is seen as a system that interacts purposefully with its transactional and contextual (Trist, 1981) environments. The transactional environment involves specific stakeholders whose interactions with and expectations from organizations impose objectives on them. The contextual environment involves developments in society and the economy relevant to the organization but not specifically directed to it (Davis, 1982).

The sociotechnical systems model assumes that the organization can be usefully modeled as a social system consisting of people acting in roles acting through a technical system, consisting of the means used to accomplish the organization's work. It assumes a clear and definable boundary between the organization and its environment through which the organization exports its outcomes and gains access to the resources needed to sustain its activity. The model derives directly from open-systems biological models (Bertalanffy, 1980).

The open-systems model is clearly a metaphor (Morgan, 1980), which Weick (1979) has critiqued as a particular enactment or simplification imposed upon an obscure and equivocal reality. Precisely such enactments are necessary preconditions for competent action. The design challenge, framed as an open sociotechnical system, directs attention toward technical and organizational considerations, stakeholder objectives, and environmental issues; all important concerns of competent design practice.

Principle 7: Human Values

The objective of organizational design should be to provide high quality work. (Cherns, 1976)

Quality of Working Life (QWL) has become a generic term referring to a wide range of efforts to improve conditions of work. This principle argues that the needs and hopes of workers should be expressed in design criteria or values. It assumes that there must be a quid pro quo if we expect greater worker investment in organizational purposes.

Codifications of the values implicit QWL have been developed in the US by Walton (1975), in Europe by Emery and Thorsrud (1976) and amplified by Davis and Taylor (1979). Expectations of the workplace are both influenced by national cultures (Emery and Throsrud, 1976) and, paradoxically, idiosyncratic to organizations (Levine, 1983). Thus, it is important that each organization assess its QWL to produce design relevant information (Levine, Taylor, and Davis, 1984). Assessments utilizing the language of the workplace (Meissner, 1976) will be more locally valid and useful for design than surveys based on the measured abstractions of researchers.

Not everyone has the same needs, goals, and expectations. Therefore, options should be provided for individuals to realize that measure of involvement, responsibility, growth, and variety that suits them. It may not be possible to achieve everyone's objectives simultaneously (Cherns, 1976).

We should not wax poetic about the quality of the jobs we design using STS principles. No matter how radical the changes or significant the improvements, neither consultants nor managers would prefer such jobs as life long careers.